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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Volume XXIV January, 1936 Number 2
THE EXTRATERRITORIAL POWERS OF A
M1UNICIPALITY
By WMLIAM HMInGwAY*
It is the purpose of this paper to ascertain the nature and
extent of the power of a municipal corporation to purchase,
acquire, and hold lands outside of its municipal boundaries,'
In approaching this problem we will first discuss generally the
nature of the powers of a municipal corporation under the
American system of municipal law. We will then consider in
detail the powers of such a corporation to acquire, own and
hold land under the following circumstances: (1) when the
property is within the territorial boundaries of the municipal-
ity; (2) when it is outside the municipality, but not within an-
other municipality; (3) when it is within the territorial limits
of another municipality; and (4) when it is in another state.
In determining the nature and extent of the power in each
instance, we shall consider whether it is implied, incidental or
indispensable. We shall consider whether a municipality may,
under any circumstances, own and possess land in another mu-
nicipality. If it does have this power, is it implied, incidental
or indispensable I
For some time, writers and jurists have been in disagree-
ment as to the exact nature of the powers exercised by munici-
palities.2 This disagreement is especially noticeable in the deci-
* Prof. of Law, University of Mississippi; Ph. B. 1889, Univ. of
Miss.; LL. B. 1898, Millsaps Coll.; compiler of 1917 Code of Miss., and
Miss. Form Book, 1927; reviser Elliott on Bailments and Public Call-
ings, 1929.
1 This subject is discussed by Professor William Anderson in a
series of two articles, "The Extraterritorial Power of Cities," 10 Minn.
L. Rev. 475, 564 (1926).
' See Eaton, "Right to Local Self-Government," 13 Harv. L. Rev.
441, 470, 638 (1900); 14 Harv. L. Rev. 20, 116 (1901), and compare with
McBain, "The Doctrine of an Inherent Right of Local Self-Government,"
16 Col. L. Rev. 190, 299 (1916).
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sions of the New England courts during and shortly after
the colonial period. It is also noticeable to a lesser extent in
the court decisions of some of the other states, during the same
period. According to one view the common law vested cities or
municipalities with certain inherent rights, so that they possess
certain powers not expressed or impliedly granted by the state3
Without delving into the merits of this argument it is sufficient
to note that the accepted view today of the vast majority of
state courts, and of writers as well, is that municipalities are
subservient to the state and-have only those powers granted to
them by the state.4 Since under the federal Constitution all
powers not delegated to the federal government are reserved
to the states it results that the state determines the units of
local government, and, as is generally conceded, the state exer-
cises all rights over local government. It grants to the munici-
pality its charter which, with the acts of the Legislature, -are
the sources of the power vested in the municipality. This being
the accepted view we will pass over the arguments of those who
contend that municipalities possess certain inherent rights.
In certain respects a municipal charter may be compared
to the federal Constitution. The federal Constitution contains
only delegated powers-delegated to the national government
by the sovereign power of the nation. The state delegates to
the incorporated municipality all the powers which it possesses.
Since the state creates municipalities, they have no powers ex-
cept those granted by state law.5
It is immaterial whether the municipal charter be obtained
3 See Eaton, Zoc. cit. supra note 2.4 Tooke, "Construction and Operation of Municipal Powers," 7
Temple L. Quar. 267, at 271 (1933) says, "If we recognize the fact that
our municipal corporations are strictly of a public nature, owing their
existence and their powers to the legislative will of the state, it in-
evitably follows that the only powers they can exercise are those that
are clearly delegated to them by the state."
5Professor Tooke thinks that the only possible approach to the
problems of the extent, interpretation, and exercise of powers by mu-
nicipalities is through "our present institutional system of determin-
ing the powers in any given case based upon the assumption that the
municipality has only those powers which are directly granted or im-
plied from .the express grant in the light of the general welfare clause,
other statutes in pari materia, and all existing and settled principles
for the interpretation of powers as found in the doctrines of statutory
Interpretation, applied in view of the effect which legislative and judi-
cial policies must necessarily have when the solution is not clear and
explicit." 7 Temple L. Quar. 267, 287-288.
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under the home rule provisions of the state constitution or by
statute.6 The rule is that the municipality is limited in its
powers to the grants made in its charter and by acts of the state
legislature. This rule was laid down at an early date by the
courts and it was concisely stated by Judge Dillon in his work
on municipal corporations, as follows: "It is a general'and un-
disputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation pos-
sesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others:
First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily
or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted;
third, those -essential to the accomplishment of the declared
objects and purposes of the corporation,--not simply conven-
ient, but indispensable. " 7 Sometime later this rule was worded
in the following terms by McQuillin il his work on'municipal
corporations: "Accordingly a more accurate statement of the
general rule would be: A municipal corporation possesses and
can exercise, first, all powers granted in express terms consist-
ent with the United States Constitution, treaties and laws, and
the state constitution and general laws of the state; second, cer-
tain implied or incidental powers, in like manner consistent
(1) necessarily arising from those expressly granted, or (2)
those essential to give effect to powers expressly granted, or
(3) those recognized as pertaining or indispensable to local civil
government, to enable it to fulfill the objects and purposes of
its creation. "s
It is apparent that Judge Dillon looked to a third type of
power; that is, those "essential to the accomplishment of the
declared objects and purposes of the corporation,-not simply
convenient but indispensable." He rejected the doctrine that
municipalities possess certain inherent powers, as had been
suggested by Judge Cooley and other jurists and writers.9
I See Tooke, "The Status of the Municipal Corporation in Ameri-
can Law," 16 Minn. L. Rev. 343, 359 (1932). See also A. T. Dedden,
"Power of a City to Appropriate Funds for Advertising Purposes,"
S U. of Cin. L. Rev. 465, 476-477 (1931).
11 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed. 1911), 448-449, Sec. 237.
1 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2nd ed. 1928), 914-916,
Sec. 367.
• See the citations made by McBain, Zoo. cit. supra note 2. Note the
conclusion reached by that author in regard to the views that have
been advanced by jurists and writers that there is an inherent power
in municipalities. "It seems reasonable to conclude that every one of
the four arguments that have been advanced in support of the doctrine
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Dillon placed border line cases, that is, those in which the power
was not clearly implied, under the head of essential powers or
those powers indispensable for the accomplishment of munici-
pal purposes. It was MeQuillin's view that municipal powers
should be divided into express and implied powers. He sub-
divided the implied powers so that they included the third part
of Dillon's rule. In the viewpoint of the writer, MeQuillin's
interpretation seems best. However, MeQuillin, in his explana-
tion of the rule, at times infers that cities have certain in-
herent powers.10 The writer does not agree with this concep-
tion of the powers exercised by a municipality.
It is submitted that municipalities possess and exercise
only 'two types of powers---express and implied.1 1 In the main,
the express powers of a city are to be found in its charter,
although these may be increased or elaborated upon by statute
or even by the ionstitution of the state. All other powers ex-
ercised by a municipality must be implied from those expressly
granted in order to be valid. It is the function of the courts to
determine, as litigations are presented, whether the powers ex-
ercised by the municipalities are express or implied.12 If the
courts find that the powers exercised by the municipality are
neither express nor implied, then it is their duty to hold that
the municipality has gone beyond its grant of powers.
We will now discuss the question of how a municipal cor-
poration may acquire lands within its territorial limits. It is
agreed that in the absence of restrictions in the municipal char-
ter or in the law of the state a city may acquire property in any
of an inherent right of local self-government is fatally defective in
character. However salutary the application of such a doctrine might
have been in the course of the evolution of relations between state
legislatures and 'municipal corporations in the United States, it seems
clear that upon careful analysis the entire line of reasoning by which
it had been sought to be sustained is resolved into a thin tissue of
legal sophistication." Id. at 315.
"For example, note the following statement, 3 McQuillin 704, See.
1204: "The power to acquire property may be derived from the con-
stitution, statute, charter, or it may be inherent in the municipality."
Italics supplied. See also 1 McQuillin 512, Sec. 188.
ImElliott, Municipal Corporations (1925) 34, Sec. 38, "All powers
may be classified in two general groups as 'express powers', and 'im-
plied powers'. Those that are express, are such as the legislature has
set forth in so many words. Those that are Implied, are such as,
though not thus expressed, are involved in what has been expressed."
3 See Reed, Municipal Government in the United States (1934),
31-49, Chap. HI.
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ordinary method. Thus, in the absence of any particular pro-
vision to the contrary, a municipality may obtain the title tO
property by purchase, dedication, gift, devise or bequest, the
act of incorporation, grant from the state, redemption from a
sheriff's sale, prescription, condemnation proceedings in a
proper case where the power has been conferred by statute, or
in any other way in which title to property is acquired.'5 How-
ever, if the charter prescribes a particular mode of acquiring
land, then the municipality must follow the dictates of the
charter.
In acquiring lands by purchase, cities are restricted in a
number of ways. The fact that money may be expended only
for public purposes is one check or limitation upon the acquisi-
tion of lands by the city. There are other restrictions, but un-
less they are express or clearly implied, then cities may acquire
and hold lands within their territorial limits by any of the
methods enumerated above. In certain instances, the land
owned does not have to be used for public purposes. The city
may usually put its property to any use the municipal authori-
ties may deem necessary. For example, if the municipality re-
ceives land as an outright gift it may leave the property
undeveloped, may rent 'or lease it, or put it to such uses as the
municipal authorities think best.14
Since the city may acquire, and hold lands within its terri-
torial boundaries in any of the ways mentioned, may it acquire
property beyond its boundaries in the same way? There have
been many cases decided by the courts involving this question.' 5
If the municipal charter permits, or the state constitution or
the legislative authority expressly grants the power to the city,
then there can be no doubt but that the city' may acquire lands
outside of its boundaries. 16 In certain instances, the power has
See 3 McQuillin 723-725, Sec. 1220.
1 See 3 McQuillin, Sees. 1220-1230.
"2 Id. 708-709, Sec. 1210. Also see the cases cited in the text and
notes by Anderson, Zoo. cit. supra note 1.
iThis would naturally follow from the express grant of power by
the state. See Anderson, Zoo. cit. supra note 1, at 481, who says, "A
municipal boundary is, in fact, not a limit of ownership but of juris-
diction, and if we remember to think of the corporation as a 'bundle
of jurisdictions' we shall see that a city may actually have several
boundaries for different purposes." See also 3 McQuillin 408-409, Sec.
1210, who says, "Notwithstanding earlier rulings to the contrary, in-
cluding dicta, likely influenced to some extent by an esteemed author
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been exercised as a matter of necessity. Some cities have become
so thickly populated or certain needs have become so pressing
that the cities have found it necessary to acquire lands beyond
the city limits for public purposes. For example, New York
City obtains its water supply from reservoirs more than a hun-
dred miles from the city boundaries. In this, and similar
cases, the legislature has expressly granted the city the right
to purchase lands beyond its limits in order to supply the in-
habitants with water.17 The rights over property acquired
under such circumstances are the same as if the reservoirs and
pipe lines were entirely within the city limits. There are other
needs which have resulted in states expressly giving to cities
the right of acquiring property beyond their municipal limits;
such as need for park space, needs for obtaining gravel and
stone for street construction, etc.' s
It is easy for courts to decide cases when the power is ex-
pressly granted to the city to acquire property beyond the ter-
ritorial boundaries. It is a more difficult question if the city
charter or the laws of the state are silent on the subject. In one
case it was held that the power to go outside of the city limits
for a water supply was implied from the provisions of the char-
ter empowering the city to establish a system of waterworks.' 9
The Tennessee supreme court reached a similar conclusion when
a city acquired lands outside of its municipal boundaries for a
reservoir.2 0 There are not many such cases, for the state leg-
islature usually grants this power to cities. It would seem rea-
sonable to hold that, in the absence of express grants of power,
the city may acquire property beyond its limits for a water sup-
ply if such is necessary. Thus, in so holding, the Georgia and
Tennessee courts reached a sound conclusion.
on municipal corporations, it is believed that the rule, supported by
the weight of authority as well as by the better reasoning, is that a
municipal corporation, where not expressly prohibited, may purchase
real estate outside of its corporate limits, for legitimate municipal pur-
poses, especially under a broad charter provision as one conferring
power to purchase and hold real estate sufficient 'for the public use,
convenience or necessities.'"
"See Anderson, lo. cit. supra note 1, 480-482.
11d. 480-496.
"Hall v. Mayor & Council of Calhoun, 140 Ga. 611, 79 S. E. 533
(1913).
30 Newman v. Ashe, 9 Baxt. (Tenn.) 380 (1876).
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Cities have on occasion found it necessary to purchase lands
beyond the citly limits for gravel pits and quarries. The ques-
tion presented to the courts in such cases has been whether, in
the absence of express grants of power, the cities may purchase
such property. There has been a diversity of opinion among
the courts in answering this question. The Virginia supreme
court has held that the right could not be implied from the pro-
visions of a city charter, and thus that the city did not have
the power to purchase land beyond its limits for a gravel pit.21
The Wisconsin and Massachusetts courts have held that cities
have the implied power to purchase and hold lands for the pur-
pose of securing gravel for use on the streets of the city.22 This
would seem to be a reasonable conclusion.I
A number of cities have found it necessary to purchase lands
beyond the city limits for sewerage drains. In such cases the
courts have generally held that the city has the implied power to
purchase the land for this purpose when the city charter or the
legislature has not expressly granted the power.2 3 It has been
held that municipalities may aid in the building of roads outside
the city limits if they lead to the city, and may assist in the
construction of bridges and other such works when it is for the
public interest of the municipality. 24 In this last group of
cases, however, the courts upholding the power of the city are
in a minority; they have more liberally construed the implied
powers of a municipal corporation than have the majority of
the courts. Thus it would seem that the holding that cities may
aid in building roads, and bridges, and that they may operate
ferries outside of the city limits, are exceptional cases.
Municipalities have, on occasion, acquired parks located out-
side the city limits. 25 When the legislature, by statute, has per-
2Duncan v. City of Lynchburg, 2 Va. Dec. 700, 34 S. E. 964 (1900);
Donable's Administrator v. Town of Harrisonburg, 104 Va. 553, 52
S. E. 174 (1905).
"Schneider v. City of Menasha, 118 Wis. 298, 95 N. W. 94 (1903);
City of Somerville v. City of Waltham, 170 Mass. 160, 48 N. E. 1092
(1898).
21 City of Coldwater v. Tucker, 36 Mich. 474, 24 Am. Rep. 601 (1877).
See cases cited by Professor Anderson, loc. cit. supra note 1, 486, n. 34.
-"McCalbe v. Mayor & Aldermen of Chattanooga, 3 Head (Tenn.)
318 (1859). See People ex rel. Murphy v. Kelly, 76 N. Y. 475 (1879).
2In Nashville v. Vaughn, 158 Tenn. 498, 14 S. W. (2d) 716 (1929),
the court interpreted a statute which authorized the acquisition of prop-
erty "near" the city, for park purposes. It held that property adjoin-
ing a park five miles from the city could be acquired.
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mitted such acquisition there is, of course, no question. How-
ever, if te power is not granted, is it implied? Could the city
acquire land for parks when there is sufficient land for this pur-
pose within the city limits? There is an interesting Mississippi
case, Lester v. City of Jackson,2 6 which is in point. According
to the facts Mrs. Ellen L. Moore, by her will, devised her late
residence to her father, and to her brother-in-law, James T. Les-
ter, for life, with remainder to the city of Jackson for a public
park. After the death of the testatrix, the sister and wife of the
plaintiff died childless and intestate. The husband, the plaintiff
in the case, was entitled to take by inheritance whatever estate
his wife inherited from Mrs. Moore. Mrs. Moore's will contained
no residuary clause, and she died intestate as to the reversion
in fee unless the devise to the city of Jackson was valid. The land
in question was a plot of some thirty-five acres, just outside of the
city limits. The plaintiff maintained that the city had no right
to take the land because its charter did not expressly confer
upon it the power to acquire land outside the city's boundaries.
The court held that the city might acquire the property for park
purposes. In reaching its conclusion it reasoned that the park
would be for a public purpose; that is, "to be enjoyed by the
same persons, and for the same uses, whether located within or
without the city limits." The court added by way of dictum
that "the city may not have the same power of police over the
park without the limits that it would over one within them, but
the laws of the state would be in full operation there, and the
right of the town, as owner, would be protected by them as are
the property rights of natural persons.''2 7  The court's reason-
ing was quite logical, but suppose that Mrs. Moore had left the
property to the city of Jackson with no mention of her purpose
in leaving it. Would the court have held that the city could
acquire the property under those circumstances? In the prin-
cipal case the court took into consideration the fact that the
park was for a public purpose, and its holding was partially
based upon the fact. It is difficult to say just what the court
would have held if Mrs. Moore had not specified that the land
" 69 Miss. 887, 11 So. 114 (1892). See my discussion of this case,
"Municipal Property Beyond the Corporate Limits and Not for Munici-
pal Purposes, Acquired through Criminal Court Action," 7 Miss. L. J.
561, at 562 (1935).
69 Miss. 887, 890, 11 So. 114 (1892).
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was to be left for use as a park. It would seem from the im-
plication that the Iississippi supreme court would have held that
it was not within the power of the city to receive the land for
other than public purposes.
It is submitted that since the city may receive land within
its territorial limits by bequest it may receive lands in the same
manner situated outside of the city limits. The only difference
the writer can see is that in the latter case the city would possess
the land as might any private individual or corporation. In
other words, the municipality would have "only those rights and
powers which spring from ownership. "28 There seems to be
little difference between the right to receive lands by bequest
and the power to receive extraterritorial property in trust for
charitable and other uses. The power to acquire property in
trust for charitable purposes has been upheld in "cases where
the property lay outside of the state.''29
Thus, the courts have held that municipalities may acquire
land outside of the municipal boundaries for a public purpose-
even though the power was not expressly given by the city
charter. It is generally held that the power is impliedly grant-
ed by the expressed provisions of the charter or state law. It is
here submitted that the municipality may acquire property out-
side of its municipal boundaries by bequest, gifts, etc.,. whether
the bequest or gift is made for a public purpose or not and that
such power would likewise be implied from the provisions of the
charter.
Since a city has the implied power to hold property outside
of its territorial limits the query arises whether it may acquire
such property by eminent domain proceedings. Also may it tax
beyond its territorial limits, and municipal boundaries? "If it
be once conceded that water supplies, parks, and similar facili-
ties are for public purposes, and even for municipal purposes
29 Note this wording of the court, Lester v. Jackson, 69 Miss. 887,
890, 11 So. 114. See Silverman v. Chattanooga, 165 Tenn. 642, 57 S. W.
(2d) 552 (1933), in which the court held that airport property may
be acquired for municipal purposes even though the land is situated
outside the corporate boundaries, and that the municipality may exer-
cise over the same the usual powers which are incident to ownership.
" Gerard v. City of New Orleans, 2 La. Ann. 897 (1847); Chambers
v. City of St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543 (1860); Vidal v. Gerard's Executors,
2 How. (U. S.) 128 (1844); Executors of McDonogh v. Murdock, 15
How. (U. S.) 367, 14 L. Ed. 73 (1853), cited by Anderson, loc. cit. supra
note 1, at 496, n. 73.
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although located outside of city limits, then there can be little
objection to the use of condemnation proceedings in the further-
ance of the public purpose.''30 Some courts have held that
cities may in certain instances tax beyond their territorial
boundaries, but Professor Anderson points out that "the pre-
ponderance of judicial opinion is undoubtedly against the power
of the city to tax real estate beyond its boundaries." ''  How-
ever, it has been held that leases may be taxed where found.
8 2
As for the police power of the city, it is generally limited to the
municipal areas. In regulating the inspection of milk, munici-
palities have been able to set up standards which dairies outside
of the city have been forced to obey.33 Thus, a city may con-
demn land outside of its limits which is to be used for a public
purpose, but generally it is restricted in its police and taxing
power over this land.
If a municipal corporation has the power to acquire, own
and hold land outside of its territorial boundaries, may it ac-
quire, and hold such property when it lies within the boundaries
of another niunicipality? If the city charter or the legislature
specifically grants this right then there is no questioning that
it has the power. There are a number of instances where cities
have been expressly given the power to own and hold land in
another municipality. Professor Anderson points out that the
reservoir and filteration plant of the city of Minneapolis lie
in an adjoining county within the incorporated city 6f Colum-
bia Heights.3 4 Land held by municipalities within the terri-
torial limits of another city is usually held under expressed
m Commins v. City of Seymour, 79 Ind. 491, 41 Am. Rep. 618 (1881)
(Drainage ditch); Matter of Mayor, Etc. of New York, 99 N. Y. 569,
2 N. E. 642 (1885) (Park); Matter of Department of Public Parks, 53
Hun. (N. Y.) 280, 6 N. Y. Supp. 750 (1880) (Park); Walker v. Cin-
cinnati, 21 Ohio St. 14 (1871) (Railroad); State ex rel. v. Port
of Astoria, 79 Or. 1, 154 Pac. 399 (1916) (Port purposes), cited by
Anderson, Zoc. cit. supra note 1, at 564, n. 75.
111d. at 569, n. 92, Anderson cites Wells v. City of Westen, 22 Mo.
384 (1856).
U Johnson v. Harrison Naval Stores Co., 108 Miss. 627, 67 So. 147
(1914) (A tax placed by the city of Biloxi on the investment in a busi-
ness conducted from Biloxi).
U City of St. Paul v. Peck, 87 Minn. 497, 81 N. W. 389 (1900); State
v. Elofson, 86 Minn. 103, 90 N. W. 309 (1902); Walton v. City of Toledo,
3 Ohio C. C. (N. S. 0. 295, aff'd in 69 Ohio St. 548, 70 N. E. 1134). See
other cases cited by Anderson, 7oc. cit. supra note 1, at 575, n. 117.
'1 1d. at 479.
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grants of power from the legislature. One can easily under-
stand how the water supply system of large cities might tran-
scend the territorial limits of several municipalities. The main-
tenance of sewerage drains, and the municipal ownership of
railways and light plants have resulted in one municipality own-
ing and holding lands within the limits of other municipali-
ties.35 However, the acquisition and possession is usually
based upon express grants of power, as it is more difficult to
imply from the charter that a city has this power.
One may ask whether an interpretation which would per-
mit a city to have such extraterritorial rights through implica-
tion can ever be justified. The writer believes that it can not,
unless the implication is plain or unless the case is one in which
it would be unreasonable to deny this power to the municipal-
ity. It is conceded that if a city needs the property for a rea-
sonably necessary purpose, it may generally, by implication, ex-
ercise such extraterritorial rights.
Suppose in the case of Lester v. City of Jackson"0 that the
land left to the city of Jackson had been in another municipal-
ity, would the holding of the Mississippi supreme court have
been the same? Since it is generally held that a municipality
may receive gifts or bequests, it is believed that the court would
have held that the city might acquire the property, but only in
the capacity of a private owner. The fact that the gift of land
was located in another municipality would not materially
matter. However, the city might be limited in its use of the
property and would be obliged to submit to any regulations
levied upon private owners. Moreover, it is reasonable to be-
lieve that the city would be under an obligation to sell the prop-
erty if it could reasonably do so. There is one constitutional
question which might be involved-would the city be permitted
to spend any money on the property? Since such expenditure
would be for a private purpose, it would seem to be an uncon-
stitutional use of the taxpayer's money. Probably the only so-
lution would be for the city to sell the property.
There is an interesting Massachusetts case concerning extra-
"Anderson, loo. cit. supra note 1, 479-485.
"69 Miss. 887, 11 So. 114 (1892).
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territorial rights of one municipality in another.8 7 According
to the facts one city, in order to obtain gravel for the construc-
tion and repair of its streets, purchased land which Was located
within the limits of another city. It seems from the statement
of facts that the land was purchased about 1876. From 1877 to
1891, including both of the years named, the plaintiff city, which
had purchased the land allowed it to be used for pasturage, and
received compensation therefor. The city in which the prop-
erty was located levied a tax on the land for the year 1893.
During that year the property was used by the defendant city
"entirely for public purposes." The supreme court of Massa-
chusetts held that there was "nothing in our statutes to pre-
vent a city from acquiring by purchase land in another city or
town for municipal purposes, if it is necessary or expedient for
the interests of its inhabitants to do so .... such property when
appropriated to public uses is exempt from taxation. "38 The
court in its opinion inferred that the land would have been sub-
jected to the tax if it had not been used for a public purpose.
If the city had purchased the land for private use, one wonders
if the holding would have been the same. The court did not
infer that the plaintiff city exceeded its power in renting the
property from 1877 to 1891. If anything, it inferred that the
city might hold property extraterritorially in the capacity of a
private owner, but that in such a case the local tax would apply
jus as for privately owned property.
It is conceded that when the power is expressly given, mu-
nicip4lities may hold and own land for a public purpose when
it is located in the territorial limits of another city. Yet, sup-
pose that the property is no longer needed for a public purpose,
is the owning municipality within its rights if it continues to
hold the property? For example, suppose a municipality owns
a gravel pit located in another city and the gravel supply is
exhausted. There being no other public purpose for which the
city might use the land, would it be obliged to sell the property?
1, City of Somerville v. City of Waltham, 170 Mass. 160, 48 N. E.
1092 (1898).
uld. at 161. In the Town of North Haven v. the Borough of Wal-
lingford, 95 Conn. 544, 111 Atl. 904 (1920), the court held that an elec-
tric light plant owned and maintained under the legislative authority,
by a municipality for its own use, and the use of its inhabitants for
pay, is exempt from taxation though located in an adjoining town.
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It seems reasonable that such would be the action of the munici-
pal authorities. Certainly a municipality is limited in the use
of land within its own territorial limits and it surely seems by
implication, if not expressly, that the charter provisions would
still more limit its power over lands held outside of its territo-
rial limits. It is thus submitted that the court in Lester 'v. City
of Jackson39 would have permitted tie city to receive the prop-
erty if it had been located in another municipality, but the city
would have been obliged to sell the property.
If the land owned by the city is within another state, then
under its charter the city would hold such property in the same
manner as though the land was in the same state.40 However,
the state in which the property is located has the sole right of
determining what recognition will be given to the right of own-
ership. It is believed that the state in which the property is
located will determine through its courts the status of the prop-
erty. Professor Anderson cites a number of such cases uphold-
ing the right of a city in another state to own land within the
state.
4 1
Before reaching our conclusions as to the extraterritorial
rights of cities there is one case which deserves notice. Through
a forfeited penal bond a city in Mlississippi acquired a lot
located in another municipality about 100 miles distant.42 No
action by the legislative power of the city was necessary other
than the acceptance of the property. The case presents the in-
teresting question, could the city own and hold the land? We
noticed in Lester v. City of Jackson43 that a city has the implied
power to acquire land by bequest. In another case it was held
that "to secure a debt due by a defaulter" land may be taken
by a municipality. 44 In other cases it has been held that cities
may accept gifts without any intention to use them for munici-
pal purposes.45 In some exceptional cases cities undoubtedly
1o 69 Miss. 887, 11 So. 114 (1892).
0Note the comment made by Anderson, loc. cit. supra note 1, at 496.
"1 See Anderson, Zoc. cit. supra note 1, "Extra State Powers," at 492,
493, 494.
1
2See Hemingway, loc. cit. supra note 26.
"69 Miss. 887, 11 So. 114 (1892).
"Phipps v. Morrow, 49 Ga. 37 (1873).
,5 See Hemingway, loc. cit. supra note 26, at 362, who cites New
Shoreham v. Ball, 14 H. I. 566 (1884). Hemingway says, "This seems
to indicate that where the municipality is passive there is no limit
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have the implied power to purchase land in another municipal-
ity.46 It would appear that lands acquired by gift or bequest
should be disposed of within a reasonable time if they are
located in another city. Certainly it seems to be a reasonable
conclusion that a city would be going beyond its powers to con-
tinue to hold property outside of its municipal limits if it is not
for a public purpose. In the principal case mentioned above it
would seem that the city might acquire the land on the for-
feited penal bond, but that it would be obliged to sell it as soon
as possible. Land held under such circumstances is subject to
all the obligations and duties placed upon private owners.
In conclusion, we find from our study that the courts have
held, in a large number of cases, that municipalities have the
implied power of purchasing and holding property situated be-
yond their territorial limits. There is good argument for this
holding, especially if the possession of the property by the city
is necessary for some public or municipal purpose. If the land
is in the nature of a gift, bequest, or derived from a forfeited
penal bond; the city may acquire title to it, even if it is located
in another municipality. However, it is reasonable to infer that
unless it is to be used for a public purpose or is suited for such
use at some future time, the city is under an obligation to sell
the property. Of course, it may be difficult to prove that the
land could not at some future time be put to a public use. In
case of gifts, bequests, or lands secured through a forfeited
bond, it is doubted if the owning municipality has any more
rights over the property than has a private individual. As for
land acquired through purchase it is believed that a city has no
implied power to purchase land within another municipality
unless it is a reasonable certainty that the land is absolutely
necessary for municipal purposes.
If cities were endowed with certain inherent powers one
might safely reach the conclusion that cities have all the rights
of acquiring, owning and holding land that are possessed by a
private corporation. However, it is almost universally agreed
that municipalities have only those powers granted by the state.
to the acquisition of property for value or income." He cites for
authority on this matter Coggshall v. Petton, 7 Johns. Ch. 292; Ham-
den v. Rice, 24 Conn. 950 (1856).
See 3 McQuillin, Sec. 1210.
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Thus, when a municipality is not given express powers to own
property beyond its city limits, the court decides the ease ac-
cording to the facts presented and ascertains whether the city
might by implication acquire extraterritorial property. As was
mentioned above, in most cases the courts have held that cities
have the implied power to accept gifts, regardless of the situs of
the property. Whether they can continue to hold the land de-
pends upon whether it might be used for some public purpose.
The power to purchase land located in another municipality-is
usually more limited. Apparently there must be some public
need which makes it necessary for the city to purchase the land.
